Table 1 |
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Parameters and variables used in this study. |
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w |
Individual fitness |
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r |
Relatedness between any two randomly selected individuals in the group |
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s |
Individual cost to cooperator growth in the group |
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k |
Number of individuals in a group (an inverse measure of kin selection) |
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c |
Individual cost to cooperator dispersal |
|
e |
Individual cost to cheater dispersal |
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Q |
Impact of sedentary cheaters on the individual fitness of group members (via consumption of the public good) |
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P |
Impact of sedentary cooperators on the individual fitness of group members (via production of the public good) |
|
n |
Relative frequency of cooperators in the group (1-n is the proportion of cheaters) |
|
z |
Relative frequency of cheaters dispersing |
|
y |
Relative frequency of cooperators dispersing |
|
d |
Overall investment in dispersal. d = yn + z(1-n) |
|
Φ |
Overall cooperation with respect to the public good. Φ = n*(1-y*)+(1-n*)z* |
|
σ |
Association between dispersal and cooperation. σ = y/(y+z) |
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Hochberg et al. BMC Evolutionary Biology 2008 8:238 doi:10.1186/1471-2148-8-238 |
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