Table 1 |
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Pay – off matrix for predator and parasite strategies. |
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parasite |
predator |
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Mild |
Virulent |
Tolerant |
Resistant |
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parasite |
Mild |
1-y |
fr(1-y)+(1-fr)(1-x) |
m |
p* m |
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Virulent |
fr(1-x)+(1-fr)(1-y) |
(1-x) |
v |
p* v |
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|
predator |
Tolerant |
-y |
-x |
z |
(1-fr) p *z + fr *z |
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Resistant |
- p * y |
- p* x |
(1-fr)*z + fr (p* z) |
p* z |
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The table differs from pay-off matrix tables for classical game theory models. The table accounts for two alternative strategies each for two different types of players namely parasite and predator. The pay-off of the parasite is not only decided by other parasites but also by the predator strategy and vice-versa. Therefore the complete pay-off of a mild parasite invading a virulent population in a tolerant host population is m * [fr(1-y)+(1-fr)(1-x)]. Others to be calculated similarly. |
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Jog and Watve BMC Ecology 2005 5:3 doi:10.1186/1472-6785-5-3 |
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