Research article

Simulation suggests that rapid activation of social distancing can arrest epidemic development due to a novel strain of influenza

Joel K Kelso¹ , George J Milne¹ and Heath Kelly^1,2,3

¹  School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia

²  Epidemiology Unit, Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, Victoria, Australia

³  School of Population Health, University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

author email corresponding author email

BMC Public Health 2009, 9:117doi:10.1186/1471-2458-9-117

Published:	29 April 2009

Abstract

Background

Social distancing interventions such as school closure and prohibition of public gatherings are present in pandemic influenza preparedness plans. Predicting the effectiveness of intervention strategies in a pandemic is difficult. In the absence of other evidence, computer simulation can be used to help policy makers plan for a potential future influenza pandemic. We conducted simulations of a small community to determine the magnitude and timing of activation that would be necessary for social distancing interventions to arrest a future pandemic.

Methods

We used a detailed, individual-based model of a real community with a population of approximately 30,000. We simulated the effect of four social distancing interventions: school closure, increased isolation of symptomatic individuals in their household, workplace nonattendance, and reduction of contact in the wider community. We simulated each of the intervention measures in isolation and in several combinations; and examined the effect of delays in the activation of interventions on the final and daily attack rates.

Results

For an epidemic with an R₀ value of 1.5, a combination of all four social distancing measures could reduce the final attack rate from 33% to below 10% if introduced within 6 weeks from the introduction of the first case. In contrast, for an R₀ of 2.5 these measures must be introduced within 2 weeks of the first case to achieve a similar reduction; delays of 2, 3 and 4 weeks resulted in final attack rates of 7%, 21% and 45% respectively. For an R₀ of 3.5 the combination of all four measures could reduce the final attack rate from 73% to 16%, but only if introduced without delay; delays of 1, 2 or 3 weeks resulted in final attack rates of 19%, 35% or 63% respectively. For the higher R₀ values no single measure has a significant impact on attack rates.

Conclusion

Our results suggest a critical role of social distancing in the potential control of a future pandemic and indicate that such interventions are capable of arresting influenza epidemic development, but only if they are used in combination, activated without delay and maintained for a relatively long period.